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Beware of Legal Transitions: A
Presumptive Vote for the
Reliance Interest
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
Transitions are, by nature, always dangerous. Ask what is most
dangerous about flying an airplane, and the answer is taking off or
landing. Want to find where automobile accidents are likely to happen?
Try getting in and out of parking lots. Wonder when accidents occur at
home? It's getting in and out of cars, houses, beds or chairs. Transitions
are risky because they inject a new dynamic into what is otherwise a
more static process. The multiplication of possibilities that transitions
create increases the risk of harm in any ongoing process, even after
people take added precautions in order to counter the dangers. We run
these risks because of the gains that transitions generate; no one wants to
wear the same clothes in winter and summer, or to remain stock-still in
the same spot for hours on end. In a very real sense, social transitions of
all sorts and descriptions are as unavoidable as the transition from day to
night (to which many of these transitions in fact respond). Simply put,
transitions are an inseparable part of ordinary life.
Transitions are not only fixed features of our everyday lives. They are
also fixed features of our legal and social environment. It goes without
saying that the pressures of social and technological: the plow often cry
out for readjustments in legal policy. In some instances, it is necessary to
correct previous mistakes in policy. In other cases, it is necessary to adapt
old legal rules to new technologies farming, the printing press, the
railroad, the radio or the Internet. We, therefore, witness a constant
procession of incremental changes through the common law, and larger
systematic changes through regulation, taxation and the modification of
liability rules. The grand question is what is the proper social attitude
toward the management of these legal transitions? Should they be
*
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago;
Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution.
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encouraged or discouraged? Be systematic or incremental? For those
legal transitions that prove desirable, should they be implemented by
constitutional amendment, legislation, common law adjudication, or
market mechanisms?
To this ubiquitous question, the common answer as of late is in favor
of a "pro-retroactivity norm-associated mainly with [Michael] Graetz
and [Louis] Kaplow-builds on the idea that such a norm, if well
published and made somewhat binding on government decisionmakers,
would give private parties, firms and individuals, an incentive to
efficiently anticipate legal change."' This theory invokes an implicit norm
of least cost avoidance. Private parties are thought to be better able to
adapt to changes in the legal order than governments are to anticipate the
behavior of private parties. Therefore, the risk of legal change is placed
not on the parties who initiate that change but on those whose expertise
is said to allow them to anticipate any changes that might be made. The
new framework in which this position is urged is avowedly
consequentialist, in which the punch line is that we should prefer an
"anticipation-based" approach to the earlier "reliance-based" approach.
The latter is more closely associated with the categorical norms from tie
Kantian or natural law tradition, and it was closely entwined with the
notion of the rule of law.2
I yield to no one in my belief that consequentialism offers the
appropriate framework for analyzing legal rules.' Ironically, however,
as in so many other cases, the basic skeptical instincts of the natural
lawyers, often seen as backward looking and anti-consequentialist, do
better by this consequentialist analysis than the newer approach that
explicitly invokes forward looking norms.' The proper approach starts
with a strong presumption and not a categorical denial: beware of legal
transitions. Wherever possible try to keep the legal framework constant,
and allow the response to societal changes to take place through private
adjustments. To give but one example, changes in technology and
preferences may lead to sharp changes in the terms of many employment
contracts, but they offer scant justification for altering the older rules
that favored freedom of contract and allowed for the contract at will. In

1.
Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions,Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress,
13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211 (2003).
2.
Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV.

1657-1700 (1999).
3.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING

INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 71-104 (1998).
4.
Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL

STUD. 253 (1980).
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other contexts, however, the outcome could easily be different: With
water rights, for example, changes in the intensity of use may well call
for the alteration of these rules in order to reduce the pressure on common
pool assets. In this water case, the transition is justified because of
tangible and immediate changes to the conditions and consequences of
the current legal regime. Common pool assets, once thought unlimited,
have become demonstrably finite, and therefore require a regulatory
response. The basic justification for this transition is that simpler rules of
capture do a weak job in preventing the exhaustion of common pool
assets, so that when demand spikes, more must be invested in controlling
access to the resource for the benefit of all involved.5 The same is true
with respect to various kinds of pooling arrangements that can be for the
preservation of the fishery, or of oil and gas fields.
In each of these examples, the case for the legal transition rested on
the fact that substantial allocative gains warranted the increased
administrative costs. Indeed, only if the marginal benefits from each
step in the legal transition are greater than the marginal costs of such a
transition, should it be implemented. By this logic, the case for hastening
legal transitions becomes more compelling when the changes in question
simplify the operation of the legal system, because then the administrative
costs of such a system decrease. Thus, the repeal of a price control or a
rent control statute will surely cause some dislocations by those who
have made investments in reliance on the continuation of the legal
scheme (just as it deterred many investments by others), but the
relaxation of the massive set of legal restraints should on average work
so great an improvement that these costs should be borne with relative
equanimity. The same can be said for the dismantling of many other
types of legal regimes, such as tariffs on trade or labor regulation.
Unfortunately, most modem legal transitions have moved matters in
the opposite direction, and have dramatically increased the administrative
costs of legal rules. In these cases, legal transitions should in general be
discouraged, and the rules on transitions should be organized in ways
that reduce their frequency. For example, if the cost of the transition is
put on the government entities and their supporters who wish to initiate
5.
This is in effect the dominant theme in Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (Pap. & Proc. 1967). For the Japanese
illustration, see Mark Ramseyer, Water Law in Imperial Japan: Public Goods, Private
Claims, and Legal Convergence, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 63 (1989). For an American
instance, where "imperative necessity" was found to justify the transition in legal rules, see
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449 (1882).
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the change, they will be less likely to go forward with it. One obvious
reason for this anti-transition bias is that transitions are costly even when
perfectly done. The time, expense, and uncertainty created by the
development and implementation of new legal rules should always tilt
the scale in favor of the status quo. In many cases, moreover, the new
transitions that promise justice or efficiency are fraught with hidden
perils that overwhelm programs that have broad levels of social support.
The massive developments with the Telecommunications Act of 1996
have followed paths that no one predicted, and which have caused
serious dislocations within the industry.6 The adoption of Title IX to deal
with sex discrimination in educational institutions that receive support
from the federal government has also generated massive dislocations by
the imposition of the proportionality by sex requirement for intercollegiate
athletics.7 In both these cases, statutes that purported to have relatively
modest objectives were expanded in their scope and impact by administrative
decision so that the final resting point seemed far removed from the
initial statutory objectives. Even the most well-meaning transitions carry
with them this danger of overshooting the mark-assuming that they
were headed in the right direction in the first place. The once popular
aphorism-an old tax is a good tax-carries with it a fair bit of wisdom.
It is not that individuals and firms are incapable of making adjustments
to changes in their legal environment. Rather, it is that they are required
to incur the costs of so doing. Given that somber reality, the initial
premise ought to be that the residual risks of change, whether or not
anticipated, ought to be borne in the first instance by those who
champion or initiate the change, and not those who are asked to respond
to it. Both justice and efficiency point in this direction.
In making any global assessment of the equitable distribution of the
costs associated with transitions, much depends on our views of the
expected value of legal transitions. In particular, the threshold question
is whether we regard government actors as purposive agents for good, or
as necessary evils that we first select and then tolerate because we fear
the greater chaos that will arise in their absence. The first of these views
treats governments as honest agents of the public interest. The second
registers substantial doubts on that proposition.

6. For an account of the political infighting that led to critical decisions under the act,
see PErER HUBER, TELECOM UNDoNE-A CAUTIONARY TALE, COMMENTARY 34 (2003).
7. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2000). The appropriate response here is to abolish Title IX.
The transition costs of that change are close to zero. For my latest plea in that direction, see
Richard A. Epstein, Just Do It!: Title IX as a Threat to University Autonomy, 102 MICH. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2003).
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Ideally, the system could be organized so that all legal changes were
Pareto efficient to the extent that government could make them so. First,
we would introduce only changes in laws that by our best collective
estimates improved the overall size of the social pie. Next, we would
arrange side payments to compensate the losers from the legal changes
in question. Each transaction would be a self-contained deal that would
produce overall improvements. Indeed, in many cases the gains could
be made proportionate to the initial investments so that the surplus is
allocated in a fashion that allows each person to receive the same rate of
return on his private investments to the common good. In the private
sector, this result is achieved by investment in partnerships and
corporations, all of which have that feature built in on the ground floor.
Alternatively, we could relent on the Pareto test and count on our
virtuous government enacting those changes that produce larger benefits
to winners than the losses it imposed on losers. The use of this KalderHicks formulation would not make all transitions win/win across the
board, but it would rule out at the front end any negative sum
government projects in which the gains of the winners are not sufficient
to compensate the losers, while leaving those winners better off as well.
The distributional consequences might be unpleasant in any individual
case, but even that unhappiness would tend to even itself out over the
long-haul; the virtuous government does not target insular and isolated
minorities, but rather treats the welfare of all its citizens equally. In so
doing, the constant procession of sound overall legal innovations will
leave, after the dust settles, few if any losers behind. The basic point is
that over large numbers of events with virtuous governments, the Pareto
test and the Kaldor-Hicks test converge, with (ironically) the slight edge
to the latter insofar as it eliminates the costs needed to calculate
compensation on a piecemeal basis for each and every social reform
precisely because virtuous governments only generate net advantages.
The virtuous government will be hampered in its quest for good deeds
by a constitutional or political restraint on its ability to implement its
preferred programs.
There is, however, a very different view of government that supports a
very different view of legal transitions. The public choice position,
somewhat oversimplified, says that public officials, even when bound by
the oaths of office, do not gravitate toward legislative programs that are
always calculated to advance the common good in either of the two
senses mentioned above. Self-interest is a strong driver of individual
behavior outside of political institutions, and people do not check their
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personal passions and inclinations at the door when they assume public
office. Much of constitutional law in the United States is directed to the
proposition that legislatures will often take advantage of discrete and
insular minorities, to use the famous phrase of the Carolene Products
decision.8 The result is that an unconstrained legislature has no particular
institutional incentives to approve only those changes that are either
Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Rather, it will initiate and ratify changes
that in many cases will lead to net losses, factional gains and
bureaucratic bloat. In some cases it will do this directly; in others, as
with telecommunications and Title IX, it will delegate power to
administrative agencies staffed by individuals with partisan agendas.
Accordingly, a presumptive case can be made out for judicial intervention
that in some ways will improve the odds that legislation will only take
the form of introducing socially desirable changes.
The case is at best presumptive, alas, because there is no bullet-proof
institution that can determine which legal transitions count as social
improvements and which ones do not. Try as we may, the only force
that human ingenuity has been able to devise to counteract the forces of
partisan politics is the judicial intervention of judges, who by design
bear little or no forms of political accountability. In the end, therefore,
we find that the question of institutional arrangements is always a
question of toting up alternative imperfections. Do we think that
unaccountable judges offer an effective counterweight to legislative
bodies that are subject to democratic pressures that routinely vary from
enlightened to demagogic?
In this debate, I have long championed the view that a heightened
level of judicial intervention does make sense, at least under a
constitution that regards its primary missions as the preservation of
liberty and property. 9 Common law rules of property, contract and tort
provide a serviceable backdrop for social interaction, so that it becomes
appropriate to treat them as a baseline by which we judge the soundness
of any general rule. Where a law works in particular fashion, as to
condemn the land of a given individual, we make up the shortfall by
direct compensation. Where the law works in general form, it becomes
impossible to use specific mechanisms of compensation to see that its
benefits and burdens fall equally across the population at large.'" This
8. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
9. See Richard A. Epstein, The Active Virtues, 9 REG. 14 (1985), reprinted in
JudicialReview: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error,4 CATO J. 711 (1985).
See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth
10.
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without
just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
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test of proportionate impact does not rule out democratic decisions on
what changes should be made; rather, it gives individual legislators an
incentive to vote in ways that are socially responsible. If each person
gets "n" percent of the gain and bears "n" percent of the loss from any
government program, the only way that he can vote to maximize his own
welfare is to maximize that of his fellow citizens. The proportionate
impact rule tends to be incentive compatible in that it makes people
"show their cards," revealing their true preferences as to whether any
piece of legislation works to their own benefit. In so doing, the rule
usually leads to decisions that are socially optimal, because the only way
that one person can advance his own interest is to advance the interest of
his fellow citizens at the same time. The system is far from foolproof,
and there are many cases in which the harms and benefits are not quite in
sync across the population as a whole. A uniform tax of fuel, for
example, might impact individuals who drive SUVs more heavily than
those who drive compact cars, resulting in a wealth shift between them.
But in these cases it is in general not a good idea to push to hard on the
takings requirement because it is unclear just what tax is ideal for the
purposes. As long as the level of incidence is small per unit, and the
number of units very large, it becomes foolhardy to impose a compensation
requirement. However, as the number of targets is reduced and the net
redistribution increases, that passive option becomes far less attractive.
Yet, we are always required to draw some line, and the heightened
judicial intervention rule remains our most attractive option because the
added cost of a dual mechanism will on balance be less than the benefits
of this rule in imposing procedural and popular restraints against various
forms of partisan abuse. It would not make sense to allow, without
compensation, a rule that prohibited further construction in a given city
region when all owners except one have built-out their properties, such
that they benefit from a restriction that has a single concentrated loser."
Similarly, it would not make sense to allow a rule that forced people
who had not built on their property and did not participate in the
democratic process to pay for the pollution caused by people who had
already built and thus were in a position to shape the local rules to their
advantage through the political process.' 2

public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
II.
See, e.g., Haas v. San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979) (wrongly sustaining
such a restriction without compensation.).
12.
See, e.g., Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
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The choice of attitudes regarding the government virtue maps closely
onto the questions of legal transitions. If we start with a virtuous view of
government writ large, there is little reason to oppose legal transitions.
The legislature will move from good to better; the courts will do the
same. With this view of the world, individuals who plan their actions at
TI should be aware of social changes that will be made at T2 and take
into account that their conduct may in the end be judged under standards
that were not in place at the time they made their original decisions. The
upshot is that individuals will behave in a more responsible fashion even
before the legislature or court has made the appropriate adjustments to
existing law. The coordination game thus has a corner solution: the
maker of the legal rule has perfect freedom; the private party is dutybound to anticipate its changes, which as a rational agent it will do.
That solution, however, makes little sense in a world in which the
legislatures and courts are themselves imperfect institutions whose
changes are as likely to introduce mischief as social improvement. At
this point, the private parties are now asked to bear the risk of changes
that are socially destructive, and to organize their operations and
investments in ways that resist the silliness of government initiatives and
programs. This anticipation is all the more difficult when individuals have
to foresee not only beneficial changes, but also unpredictable changes
bought by lobbying interests groups. The far superior solution in this
case is one that places some restraint on the power of governments at all
levels to so act. Compensation for losses induced by legal changes is
one possible alternative, which is, however, very difficult to implement
with respect to general changes in the legal rule. Another alternative is a
limited form of grandfathering to protect the reliance interests of those
who acted under the previous regime. Still a third possibility is just to
strike down the changes to begin with, which offers some hope in those
cases where courts negate legislative changes under their power of judicial
review. But this last measure works, to say the least, far less effectively
when courts are asked to constrain the unwise initiatives that they (or
other courts) have initiated. At one level, therefore, the point of this argument
is to caution all decisionmakers against the initiation of legal transitions,
especially those that deviate from traditional common law rules. At
another level, it is to examine whether some legal test can be applied to
distinguish, case-by-case, those changes that are social improvements
from those that are not.
In order to carry out this program, I shall look at three cases in which
it has been urged that the government be given broad powers to initiate
535 U.S. 302 (2002) (upholding a moratorium on construction without compensation).
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legal changes without any constraints of the sort mentioned above. The
first of these involves the introduction of retroactive changes in taxation.
The second involves the refusal to make compensation (at least in full)
when the government takes buildings and other improvements to real
estate. The third involves retroactive changes in product liability law.
Retroactive Taxation. One common element of the traditional natural
justice view of taxation takes a deeply suspicious attitude towards
retroactive changes in the law. Individuals have a right to rely on the
law as it is stated and should not be penalized after the fact for actions
that were legal when made. Just this theme of fair notice of the rule is
impounded, for example, in Lon Fuller's conditions as to what counts as
a good law. 3 Further, the requirement of notice and fair hearing is
similarly impounded into much administrative law under the due process
clause, on grounds of fundamental fairness. The intuition is that limitations
on the power of the government to reverse field are one strong way in
which to limit the scope of government abuse, a paramount concern of
the public choice view of the world.
That set of concerns is said to vanish once we think that government
policies are revised with only the public good in mind. Under this view,
rational investors could foresee the risk of changes in the law that are
adverse to them, just as they can foresee the possibility of legal changes
that work to their advantage. In dealing with their decisions, they can
impound both forms of uncertainty into the price, so that it becomes a
form of double compensation to award them compensation after the fact
for risks that they had assumed before the fact. The argument continues
that these investors do not have to make any returns to the government
for legal changes that cut in their favor, to which the prohibition against
retroactive changes does not apply. The net effect, therefore, is some form
of double-compensation for risk. 4 Consequently, the more economicallyminded authors have come out against compensation for any form of
protection against retroactive changes in the tax law.'" As a practical
matter, these results have borne fruit in the decided cases, many of
which offer lip service to the idea that the government should be forced
13.

See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW (1964).
14.
See DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSIrION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 18 (2000); Barbara H. Fried, Ex
Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123 (2003).
15.
See Michael Graetz, The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 47 (1977); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARv.

L. REV. 509 (1986).
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not to introduce retroactive regimes. However, they allow just these sorts
of changes because ordinary individuals are in a position to foresee that
the government might have good and valid reasons to change the legal
regime under which taxation has taken place. 6
I remain deeply suspicious of these findings precisely because I see no
reason to think that the new government regimes will on balance be
better than the ones that they replace. The point is not the cynical view
that all changes in taxation are always worse than the regime that they
displace; it is rather than the changes in question have equal chances of
being good or bad, so that carte blanche with respect to future changes is
likely to do as much harm as good. The necessary question, therefore, is
whether there is some way in which we can seek to improve on the carte
blanche rule. In this regard, it is instructive to look first at one case
demonstrating the sorry state at which matters can fall under the Internal
Revenue Code.
In United States v Carlton," the Court held that there was no due
process violation from a retroactive repeal of an estate tax provision on
which the petitioner had explicitly relied, so long as Congress acted
promptly and advanced a legitimate state interest. The Court further
held that the state had such a legitimate interest in the protection of
revenue against an excessive use of an estate tax deduction, in this
instance then new Section 2057(a). This section allowed an estate tax
deduction equal to one half the market value of company shares sold by
the estate to its employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP"). The taxpayer
had purchased shares of MCI Communications in the open market for
over $11 million and resold them two days later to the MCI ESOP,
suffering an economic loss of around $630,000, but claiming a
deduction of over $5 million. In 1987, after the transaction had been
completed, Congress repealed Section 2057(a), both prospectively and
retroactively. The original idea behind Section 2057 was to allow
individuals who already held stock in a company before death to sell it
to an ESOP to claim the deduction. Congress did not anticipate that
others would buy stock in the open market after death to take advantage
of the provision, which increased revenue losses from an anticipated
$300 million (over a five year period) to $7 billion for that same period.
The obvious question is how best to sort out this unseemly mess.
First, it is peculiar why this particular provision of the estate tax was
passed at all, since it looks like the type of gimmick that is utterly
16. See Pension Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984)
("[T]he strong deference accorded legislation in the field of national economic policy is
no less applicable when that legislation is applied retroactively.").
17. 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
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inconsistent with any sensible scheme of taxation. At this point, we can
see evidence of the asymmetry illustrated by Graetz and others: a special
interest loophole that looks indefensible on its own terms even if the
taxpayer had owned the shares of MCI at the time of death. Yet, under
the American constitutional system, it is much harder to challenge
giveaways from government than it is to challenge government exactions.
The latter situation is one for which the taking challenges are in principle
available. The former has to be based on some nebulous version of the
public trust doctrine, which provides "nor shall public property be given
for private use, without just compensation,"'" for which it is very
difficult to find in the Constitution a viable doctrinal home.
In a first-best world, however, we should initially ask the question as
to whether some individuals should be allowed to challenge these
giveaways. The answer should be in the affirmative, as it has been in
cases under the establishment clause that (haltingly) allows citizenstanding against public giveaways to religious institutions.'9 At this point,
some eager interest group will challenge the giveaway, so that the entire
sequence of events will never take place at all. At the very least, the
taxpayer now has explicit notice that the provision under which he
wishes to proceed is at risk. The next question is whether that taxpayer
challenge should succeed. The answer to that question is also yes,
assuming that the estate tax itself is constitutional. The overall concern
with public choice issues immediately singles out any gimmick that is
available to some and not to all, in light of its disproportionate impact.
The net effect is that we do not have to face Carlton's sorry tale of back
and forth government at all. The gist of the argument is that stronger,
not weaker, forms of judicial supervision are the appropriate way to deal
with taxpayer efforts to lobby a fast one through the government. In
contrast, the implicit theme of Graetz, Kaplow and their followers is that
lower levels of judicial supervision should be allowed in order to permit
the correction of abuses once they occur. This view is incorrect because
higher levels of scrutiny that go both ways stop the abuses from
occurring in the first place. Yet today, all efforts to stop government
giveaways on constitutional grounds seem to have come to a dead-end
18.
Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine,7 CATO J.411 (1987).
19.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), as limited in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).

For my defense of general taxpayer and citizen standing, see Richard A. Epstein,
Standing and Spending-The Role of Legal and EquitablePrinciples, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1,
59-61 (2001).
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after the Supreme Court used in essence a rational basis test to sustain a
grand legislative giveaway under the Copyright Term Act Extension
Act." It is no coincidence that the rhetoric of deference that greased the
decisions in favor of retroactive government regulation also greased
them for copyright giveaways that dry up the public domain.
Now that two-sided judicial intervention looks dead, we have to recognize
that the Carlton situation necessarily involves a second-best problem of
deciding whether Congress is within its rights of knocking out a tax
advantage retroactively that it should never have passed in the first
place. One argument is, of course, that Carlton-like changes to the tax
code prevent a massive erosion of the public's fiscal health. Once again,
however, this argument is indeterminate because it could be said just as
easily that Congress would exercise greater care to avoid the creation of
loopholes once it knew that it could not reinstate the tax (or deny the
deduction) on the transactions that had been consummated before any
future repeal. Financial losses to the state create strong incentives for it
to control the dispensation of benefits in the first place. It is at best idle
speculation to guess from a social welfare perspective how the two
scenarios play out, but one argument in favor of allowing this taxpayer
to get away with the scam is that it will knock down the number of
loopholes the legislature will pass initially. That alternative has to be
preferred to the current situation. After all, it was at least a possibility
that this particular loophole might have survived longer than it did,
which means that the next tax gimmick might work after all. If so, the
choice of the tough taxpayer rule may work wonders in the individual
case, but lead to the proliferation of greater efforts to obtain loopholes in
the first instance and to defend them to the last breathe thereafter.
At this point, it should be possible to gain a clearer sense of how tax
legislation should work. The central problem for the government is to
raise the revenue needed to run its public programs. Any constitutional
provision that sought to limit the amount of taxes as, say, a percentage of
the gross domestic product, runs into the obvious objection that
government revenue needs are, at the very least, vastly different in peace
and war. Yet at the same time, it is important to develop a rule that
eliminates the endless game playing of the sort that was so evident in
Carlton. The best way to achieve both objectives is to start with the topto-bottom flat tax that removes the gameplaying with respect to
brackets.' At this point, investors still have to deal with the changes in
rates in calculating whether or not to go forward, but on that score they
20.
See Eldred v Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
For my defense, see Richard A. Epstein, Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?, 19
21.
SOC. PHILO. & POL. 140 (2002).

HeinOnline -- 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 80 2003-2004

[Vol. 13: 69, 2003]

Beware of Legal Transitions
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

know that they cannot be singled out for special treatment further down
the road so that their calculations are made easier and more reliable. It is
commonly said that changes in legal regimes are just another form of
uncertainty," and while that is true (the moral hazard issue of
government misbehavior to one side), it hardly follows that we should
ever introduce any unnecessary dimension of uncertainty if a strong
structural solution is available in advance.
There are of course many tax decisions that do not have one right
answer, so it becomes incumbent to figure out how to deal with these.
The most acute problems are those with respect to expenditures that are
made on projects that last for multiple periods. The key rules are those
governing the depreciation of these investments. Here again as a matter
of first principle, the ideal rates of depreciation should exactly mirror the
economic losses associated with the project. In principle, therefore,
even a system of straight-line depreciation results in an implicit form of
tax subsidy. 3 An economic asset that has a 20 year life loses its last
year of value in the first year of use, because it is still a 19 year asset.
That amount of loss is reflected better by an amortization table, which
clocks in at far less than the five-year period of depreciation allowed
under the straight-line rule. Matters are, of course, more complicated
than this simple example, as some assets (e.g. movies, cars) may lose
huge portions of their value in the initial period. However, with
standard assets, it follows that the various forms of accelerated
deprecation allowed under the Internal Revenue Code only compound
the dangers. Theses changes are at this point beyond the scope of
judicial review in part because it is so difficult to figure out what the
accurate measure of depreciation should be in many contexts. But now
that there is no constitutional intervention at the initial level, the
question is what should be the appropriate judicial response to the
second-best question of changes in tax regimes.
The first point to note on this second best question is that the key
decisions are usually made on the strength of the tax regime in place at
the time, and it will certainly improve the ability of investors to make
their estimations if they have confidence that this legal regime will
remain in place for the expected life of the investment. At this point, the
concern is with the both ways test, and the proper response is that the
22.

See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 15, at 520.

23.

For the basic discussion, see MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME
A GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 141-48 (7th ed. 1994).
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initial depreciation schedules available at the time of passage should
remain in place for the duration of that asset. All other changes should
be made on a going-forward basis, whether they benefit the taxpayer or
work against his interest. Blocking both-ways changes is necessary to
prevent the gaming of the system by taxpayers, who now have less
incentive to lobby for greater tax breaks since they will no longer be able
to obtain them.
The depreciation deduction only determines the rate of taxable income
within the particular period, and every taxpayer has to take the same risk
of changes, up or down in general rates under, ideally, a flat tax system.
Once again, the government gets its discretion over revenue, while
property owners are protected under the general rate structure against
being singled out by a retroactive change in the depreciation rules that
cover the future periods for past losses. On balance this system is
respected under the Internal Revenue Code where the legislature
announces that various rules apply to projects begun on different dates.
In this system, the individual taxpayer could protest the loss of a
depreciation deduction allowed at the time of construction, while the
general taxpayer (with standing, of course) could protest any additional
advantage conferred on that taxpayer. By constraining the political
dimension, it should be possible to improve both investment decisions
and tax decisions simultaneously under a test that only requires a court
to monitor the backward imposition of changes, without having to make
wild judgments as to the allocative efficiency of this or that tax. That
alternative system seems to dominate the two-sided game playing that is
encouraged by a regime that allows tax breaks and tax penalties to be
adopted with abandon. The traditional principle against retroactive
changes makes sense, so long as it is applied relentlessly in both
directions.
Takings. Another set of issues that gives rise to the question of legal
transitions involves the appropriate rules for the taking of private
property. On this issue, I have often taken a strong position that every
change in regulation, in taxation and liability constitutes a prima facie
taking for which compensation is required unless some justification is
advanced. 24 The strong program recognizes that no compensation is in
fact required in cash for those cases in which it has been provided in
kind, and it also recognizes that certain losses in value are justified on
the grounds that they prevent present and future nuisances, both certain
and uncertain. Those justifications, however, do not reach a case that

24.
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985).
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has been much discussed in the literature, in which it is thought that
parties will have excessive incentives to build if they receive full
compensation for the losses caused by subsequent government programs
requiring the destruction of property.2" This literature argues that the
social losses and the private losses are thrown out of alignment if
compensation is paid.
The stock example to illustrate this proposition runs as follows.
Assume that a landowner has to decide to build a hotel near to the shore
at a location that will be flooded if the government thereafter decides to
build a dam. The public decision on the dam will depend on the price of
oil in world markets, so that the decision to build will only be made
when that price exceeds a certain amount. Here the decision to compensate
the landowner means that he gets the same rate of return in all states of
the world, that is, whether or not the dam is built. That hotel, however,
will have value only in those states of the world where the dam is not
constructed. The ideal social decision therefore requires the hotel owner
to take into account this possibility, which he will ignore if compensated
ex post when the hotel is razed. The upshot is that the denial of
compensation is said to be justified because it aligns the private with the
social incentives, once notice is given of the government project. The
reliance interest of the landowner has to yield to his ability to anticipate
the government action in question. The argument, moreover, has no obvious
limitations, because it could easily be extended to cover all cases of the
condemnation of improvements, even when no specific announcement
is made. The paradigmatic case of condemnation now becomes questionable
under this new analysis. For instance, this logic allows the government
broadly to proclaim that it will no longer compensate for its takings, so
that once everyone is on notice, then nobody would ever receive
compensation, notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment.
This argument has had its influence on judicial thinking even in cases
to which it does not apply: that is, to ex ante restrictions on new
construction which diminish the value of land.26 In these cases, any
For the canonical discussions, see Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land:
25.
When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 QUART. J. OF EcON. 71 (1984); Lawrence
Blume and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72
CAL. L. REV. 569, 590-94 (1984); William Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance
and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretationsof 'Just Compensation' Law,

17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 271 (1988); Daniel Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation,
9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 285 (1992).

26.

See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1070 n.5
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diminution in land value attributable to the regulation cannot be laid at
the doorstep of improper landowner behavior. But how then should the
principle apply in those cases where the construction has taken place?
The critical point is to again recognize that the potential for abuse could
well operate on both sides of the relationship. Much depends on the way
the particular program of the government is described. In the original
version of the problem, the decision whether to build the dam depended
exclusively on objective factors totally outside the control of the
government agency: let the price of oil on the spot market rise above $X
and the dam shall forthwith be built. Just that assumption is built into
Fischel and Shapiro's model, for they write that "everyone knows that
when oil prices exceed a certain level, the government will build the
dam. The government cannot be swayed from this decision by any
political activity or legal manipulations."27 This convenient stipulation
removes all reason to constrain the operation of the state officials
because they have already been deprived of all discretion. The only
remaining need is to constrain the individual, who might overbuild in the
face of the government policy.
Yet this point invites two rejoinders. First, the government may have
been motivated by strategic purposes in announcing the future plans,
which it could then abandon or delay opportunistically once the
landowner chooses not to build on the site. Next, if the situation is as
stated, the state should be required to purchase an option contract to
condemn, free of obligation for the improvement, if the stated conditions
come to pass, precisely because the trigger events fall wholly outside
government control. At this point we have the best of both worlds.
There are both constraints on the government decision to announce these
policies, and the landowner investment decisions that take these risks
into account.
In response, it could be argued that the option market could not work
because deciding whether to build the dam in an age of deep environmental
(Stevens, J., dissenting), where Justice Stevens invoked this argument to attack the
decision to allow compensation when a landowner was not allowed the right to build any
structure on his beachfront lot.
Even measured in terms of efficiency, the Court's rule is unsound. The Court
today effectively establishes a form of insurance against certain changes in landuse regulations. Like other forms of insurance, the Court's rule creates a "moral
hazard" and inefficiencies: In the face of uncertainty about changes in the law,
developers will overinvest, safe in the knowledge that if the law changes
adversely, they will be entitled to compensation.
For general support, Justice Stevens cited Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just
Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 125 (1992).
27. Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 25.
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concern always depends on unidentified factors that occur or become
evident only after the government makes its general declaration of
interest. However, the terms and conditions of the state option-we shall
build the dam when energy needs so require-do nothing to constrain
state actors from acting strategically: announce that certain new construction
might be forthcoming in order to forestall unwanted development
without paying compensation.
The inability to temporize with options forces the all or nothing
choice, in which the main question is whether private or official excesses
turn out to pose the greater risk. The risks of public misbehavior are
clearly larger because there is no independent way to limit the use of
options. Absent any form of constraint, the state could just announce
that several locations are under consideration for the new dam so that all
owners should take care. There are no comparable risks on the other
side. Even if compensation is allowed in full, the individual landowner
will only recover the fair value of his project, so that if it goes down in
value he will sustain a loss whether or not the condemnation takes place.
No one will rush to build foolish projects under the circumstances. In
addition, the rules for compensation in cases of actual takeover are
woefully insufficient.28 There is no allowance for the costs of fighting
the condemnation, for contesting the appraisals offered by the government,
for reimbursing moving costs, or for the loss of good will. It is no accident
that every single rule of compensation for land, existing structures and
established businesses understates the government obligation to compensate.
Any moral hazard on the part of the landowner is therefore effectively
countered by the puny rules for actual compensation that never leave any
owner indifferent between the property interest that he possessed and the
compensation that he received in exchange. Although this factor is
much discussed in the literature, there is most likely no real world

28. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J.)("In view, however, of the liability of all property to condemnation for the common
good, loss to the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for
property or idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police
power, is properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship."). The passage
would make sense if all landowners were equally subjected to the risk of condemnation,
but is far less attractive when the state can decide which businesses or land to condemn
for its own use. For a powerful demonstration of the shortfall of the current compensation
rules for land, see Gideon Kanner, When is "Property" Not "Property Itself": A Critical
Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for the Loss of Goodwill in
Eminent Domain," 6 CAL. W. L. REV. 57 (1969).
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situation in which the rush to construction risk will prove to be
important. The overwhelming bias of the eminent domain law works
against that of the owner in possession. The state, if it truly cares about
the risk of overcompensation, can purchase the property before construction
and sell or lease it out on whatever terms and conditions that it sees fit.
When two kinds of error are present, even of equal magnitude, place the
burden of action on the party that has the greater number of options,
which is the state in this case. The risks and magnitude of error are
anything but equal in this case.
Product Liability.
A similar set of considerations applies to
transformations in tort law, especially in product liability cases. These
cases cover those situations where a manufacturer or other seller
introduces a product into the stream of commerce, and it causes harm to
some user, consumer or bystander. 9 In practice many product liability
cases, e.g. those involving foodstuffs, take place within a relatively short
time frame so that the issue of legal transitions never surges to the fore.
But in major classes of cases, many years may pass between the time
that the product leaves the hands of the manufacturer and the occurrence
or manifestation of injury. Machine tools may be in service for years before
they harm some user. Pharmaceuticals may produce adverse consequences
only after long periods of use. Toxic substances may well cause injuries
only years after they are released into the environment (e.g. Agent
Orange) or inhaled (e.g. asbestos) in industrial settings. With these
cases, the question arises what legal rule should apply when the law has
changed between the time of manufacture and initial sale, and the time
of injury.
This question differs from that of retroactive taxation and eminent
domain law in that we are dealing typically with the incremental
developments at common law. In this area, however, the period between
1965 and 1978 counts as the watershed period, which started with the
(relatively unimportant) shift from negligence to strict liability under
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In addition, the early
cases allowed defenses for products that were subject to inspection
before being put to their normal and proper use.3" In contrast, the latter
cases held the manufacturer responsible after the product was altered by
third parties and used in a way that was neither normal nor proper, but
foreseeable to the manufacturer. The earlier law held that once a condition
29. See Restatement (Third) Torts-Products Liability § 1 (1998); Restatement
(Second) Torts § 402A (1965).
30. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944)
(concurring opinion of Traynor, J); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P. 2d
897, 900 (Cal. 1963).
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was open and obvious, the user could make a choice to use the product
in its current condition, or to refuse to do so." The latter law has held
that if the jury thinks that some precaution was cost effective, the injured
party could recover either in whole or in part for an improper use that
took place with knowledge of the known danger, thereby knocking out
one pillar of the standard product liability defenses.32 Under the earlier
versions of the law, the only defective cigarettes were those containing
contaminants. Under the modem view, a cigarette may be found defective
if it contains tobacco. These are not small shifts in doctrine, and they hit
most hard against those companies that have remained in business
throughout the entire cycle of change.
My basic sentiment is to be deeply suspicious of imposing liability on
parties based on a set of rules that were not in place at the time the
products were sold. The now-regnant position tends to be the opposite
view holding that with product liability, as with taxation, the imposition
of liability should be anticipated by the manufacturer before the law is
changed. The stated justification for this position is that it is more
important that manufacturers and others efficiently respond to change
than be permitted to act in reliance on the legal rules in place at the time
they made their marketing decisions. Adopting this stance encourages
manufacturers to stay one step ahead of the power curve.
One implicit assumption in this argument is that the new rules are
actually better than the old. But that is hardly the case. One of the
hidden rationales for the expansion of product liability law is that it
allows for the spreading of loss among product users. However, this
insurance rationale makes little sense. As was dimly understood by the
earlier writers, a manufacturer is a poor organization around which to
organize the insurance function.33 The manufacturer of a product has
little control over the skills of the individuals who use the products sold,
whether he sells direct to the customer or through distributors and
retailers. It cannot price discriminate, and is, therefore, constrained to
charge a single price for all customers no matter how great the variation
in the risks they pose. One premium has to serve for the amateur who
attempts dangerous jobs and for the skilled person who works well
31.
See, e.g., Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (N.Y. 1950).
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (N.Y. 1976).
32.
See, e.g., Huset v. J.1. Case, 120 F. 865, 867 (8th Cir. 1903) (noting the
33.
dangers of requiring the manufacturer to insure the skilled and incompetent at a single
price). For a more systematic development of this theme, see Richard A. Epstein,
Products Liability as An Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985).
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within his limits. The insurance, moreover, comes with a heavy
administrative load given the need to establish some form of defect, to
trace intermediate modifications and uses of the product, and to take into
account the plaintiff's own use, all of which are factors that land in the
lap of a jury. The older rules that limited recovery to products that
contained latent defects in their original condition that caused harm to
the customer in their ordinary use were a perfectly sensible response to
the difficulties in holding liable a party for defective products, whose
possession and use was with the plaintiff or some other third party.
There is little doubt that the case for liability, be it strict or negligence
only, is much weaker here than it is in cases of dangerous instruments
that remain in control of the defendant immediately before the
occurrence of injury, as happens with harms caused by such "abnormally
dangerous activities" as blasting, fumigating, or drilling.'
If this analysis is correct, it is no longer possible to assert that the
anticipated changes in liability rules count as social improvements. If
so, what is the gain in question from asking manufacturers of 1940 to
anticipate the standards that will be in place in 1970 or 1980? The
ostensible hope is that they will build products that meet these more
onerous rules, but the effects are likely to be counterproductive. One of
the watershed cases in the modern product liability wars is Barker v Lull
Manufacturing Co.,35 in which an inexperienced substitute operator of a
loader used it on uneven terrain for which it was neither designed nor
suited. The question of whether the loader was defective was held
properly to belong to a jury, which was free to invoke a broad cost
benefit test to decide the issue. The earlier rules, in effect when the
loader was made, would have ruled this case unsustainable because of
the obviously improper use of the equipment by the wrong person in the
wrong place. The great advantage of the older rule is that it allows
manufacturers to offer a full array of equipment. Cheaper equipment
that is easier to operate can be used in some locations, while more
expensive equipment that is harder to operate can be used for more
dangerous locales. That separation should reduce the costs of various
operations, and encourage downstream owners of the equipment (who
are typically subject to worker's compensation obligations) to exercise
more care in the selection and training of workers for various jobs, a task
that no remote manufacturer can hope to accomplish. In turn, the newer
rule will price many consumers out of the market, as the cheaper
equipment will no longer be available for sale.

34.
35.

See Restatement (Second) Torts § 519 (1977).
573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
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In asking the manufacturer to anticipate the change in rules is to insist
that it shelve sensible low-cost standard products today out of fear of
future liability. In practice, the better business strategy might well be to
sell the equipment that is currently demanded and then liquidate the
business down the road in order to avoid the sting of future liability,
even at the cost of practical wisdom and going-concern value. The shift
in legal rules, therefore, exacerbates the problem of remaining in
business, and it surely complicates the task of selling off an established
business with strong brand identification to a new purchaser who is on
the line for all the losses of the earlier business.36 Indeed, if it merges the
old corporation into its own operations, all its assets, whatever their
source, remain on the hook for these losses. The power of anticipation
could easily lead firms to take counterproductive effects. Asking people
to anticipate changes in the law in the next generation makes no more
sense than pushing on a string.
What then ought to be the appropriate social response to the changes
in legal position? The best approach is one that I worked on a generation
ago when I was a consultant for the American Insurance Association.
This approach is designed to insulate older suppliers from the corrosive
effects of new laws. It is the so-called statute of repose that insulates
defendants from any liability for the harms that their products cause in
their original condition 10 or 12 years after they part with possession.
That statute of limitations does not apply to actions that take place after
the product is sold, such as the issuance of subsequent warnings or
bulletins about newly discovered product flaws, subsequent repairs or
modifications. Further, the rule could be modified to allow for actions
in the event that a product with a known and concealed defect was sold,
which would catch perhaps some asbestos suppliers, but surely not the
raft of premise occupiers that are now routinely charged in the last round
of asbestos litigation.
In one sense, this statute of repose is overbroad for the purposes at
hand, in that it not only freezes liability at the level it was when the
product was sold, but totally insulates the manufacturer from liability
under any and all theories. The extent of the overbreadth is still less
than might be supposed however, for few if any of the products sold
would be subject to any form of liability whatsoever in the formative
36.

For the ins and outs on the subject, see Michael D. Green, Successor Liability:

The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 CORNELL

L. REV. 17 (1986).
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years. In addition, the rule has the desirable feature of forcing product
supervision, maintenance, repair and use on the parties downstream of
the parties who are now in possession of the goods in question. These
parties are likely to do more to prevent injury if they know that they
have no recourse whatsoever against the original manufacturer (not to
say distributor or retailer, who often are inappropriate targets at any
time). At this point, the only people who have to anticipate that their
liability or exposure will be increased are the present owners and users.
But if the standard theory is correct, that anticipation is the critical
variable, and there is no reason to demand impossible foresight of
manufacturers while allowing current possessors and users to ignore the
perils that stare them in the face. The theory of transitions should not be
directed at only one link in the chain of distribution. It should be applied
to parties who are in the best position to do something about the losses
in question.
The great advantage of the statute of repose is that it peels off remote
layers of defendants in an orderly fashion and, thus, shortens the chains
of liability to manageable proportions. This protection of the reliance
interest works to increase current safety far better than any rule of
anticipation. Ideally, there was no reason to incur the massive costs of
legal transition in the first instance. But if those bold and misguided
innovations are appropriate, someone should find out ways to insulate
prior actors from the consequences of these great transformations. The
stability of possession is a Humean virtue that goes unappreciated in
modem times.
Conclusion. The matter of legal transitions is one that has been with
us for a long time, and one that will not disappear from view in the
immediate future. Much of the difficulty in this area stems from the
common mistake that new changes in social behaviors and technological
advances require parallel changes in the legal system. Yet often exactly
the opposite is true. The stability of the legal regime makes it easier for
entrepreneurs, consumers and workers to respond to these changes,
without having to factor uncertain changes in the legal regime as well.
The full measure of complexity, moreover, is often concealed from view
when we examine each proposed legal change as though it existed in
isolation. In reality, if the pace of new regulation continues, the interactive
features of the various systems will create negative synergies. One
implicit assumption of product liability rules is that firms are able to
respond quickly to incentives. Yet that assumption is necessarily called
into question if movements in employment law hamper the ability of the
firm to hire, promote and, yes, fire at will. Once we are aware of the
manifold difficulties that lie in the path of successful regulatory
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initiatives, we should no longer give each bright-eyed scheme our implicit
collective endorsements. We should instead remember the old injunction of
laissez-faire, which is to view each form of state regulation under a
presumption of error. Private actors are already powerfully constrained.
The task now is to thin out the forests of legal regulations in the hope
that we can make an effective transition to a situation in which, of
course, simple rules provide guidance to a complex world.
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